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Background: Poverty undermines the adherence of patients to tuberculosis treatment. A pragmatic cluster
randomized controlled trial was conducted to investigate the extent to which economic support in the form of a
voucher would improve patients’ adherence to treatment, and their treatment outcomes. Although the trial
showed a modest improvement in the treatment success rates of the intervention group, this was not statistically
significant, due in part to the low fidelity to the trial intervention. A qualitative process evaluation, conducted in the
final few months of the trial, explained some of the factors that contributed to this low fidelity.
Methods: In-depth interviews were conducted with patients who received vouchers, nurses in intervention clinics,
personnel in shops who administered the vouchers, and managers of the TB Control Programme. These interviews
were analyzed thematically.
Results: The low fidelity to the trial intervention can be explained by two main factors. The first was nurses’
tendency to ‘ration’ the vouchers, only giving them to the most needy of eligible patients and leaving out those
eligible patients whom they felt were financially more comfortable. The second was logistical issues related to the
administration of the voucher as vouchers were not always available for patients on their appointed clinic dates,
necessitating further visits to the clinics which they were not always able to make.
Conclusions: This process evaluation identifies some of the most important factors that contributed to the results
of this pragmatic trial. It highlights the value of process evaluations as tools to explain the results of randomized
trials and emphasizes the importance of implementers as ‘street level bureaucrats’ who may profoundly affect the
way an intervention is administered.
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There is general agreement that tuberculosis (TB) remains
strongly associated with conditions of poverty [1]. Poverty
increases the risk of infection and disease and, through
its effects on nutrition as well as its impact on adher-
ence to treatment, undermines the outcomes of patients
on TB treatment.
TB is the most common cause of death in South Africa
[2] and although this is due in part to widespread co-
infection with HIV, poverty still plays an important
role in the continued significance of the disease [3,4].
Poverty may cause delays in accessing initial treatment
for TB, thus delaying the detection and treatment of
TB and its complications. Even after the initiation of
treatment, the barriers that poverty imposes on access
to treatment may also reduce the likelihood of treatment
success [5]. In South Africa, deprivation is an important
determinant of the use of primary health care services
(the level at which most TB care is delivered). The pri-
mary healthcare utilization rate is lowest (between 2.0
and 2.1 visits per person per year) in the most deprived
districts of the country and highest (3 visits per person
per year) in the least deprived (the national target for
the country at the time of the trial was 3.5 visits per
person per year) [6]. Studies among South African patients
on TB treatment have found that financial constraints are
major obstacles to the completion of TB treatment [7,8]
and TB preventive therapy [9]. Although economic inter-
ventions may assist patients to adhere to their TB treatment
schedules, very few studies have been conducted to evaluate
their effects [10]. Most of the trials that have investigated
this took place in the United States [11], and may not be
generalizable to poor- and middle-income countries where
the burden of TB is highest.
This paper reports on the qualitative process evaluation
of a cluster randomized controlled trial, in which the ef-
fect of economic support on the outcomes of patients with
active TB in South Africa was investigated [12]. The trial
itself is described below.
Description of the trial and its results
This pragmatic, cluster-randomized controlled trial was
conducted in two districts of KwaZulu-Natal, one of the
poorest provinces in South Africa which has the highest
burden of TB and HIV in the country. In this trial, patients
with drug-sensitive pulmonary TB were offered a monthly
voucher valued at ZAR120 (approximately US$15) until
completion of treatment or a maximum of eight months.
Vouchers were offered to patients and administered by the
nurses in charge of the TB program at participating clinics.
We postulated that the vouchers, if redeemed for food,
would increase patients’ food security and free up
money for use elsewhere, such as for transport to attend
the clinic. Vouchers were redeemable at selected generalstores situated close to the clinics. Patients in control
clinics received usual TB care. To prevent ‘leakage’ of
the vouchers to those not eligible to receive them, patients
were required to present their clinic cards at the shops with
their vouchers which corresponded to the clinic number on
their vouchers. In addition, nurses signed each voucher,
and stuck onto each voucher a unique sticker, without
which the voucher could not be redeemed. The trial started
on 1 July 2009 and ended on 30 September 2010, when the
last recruited patients had completed their full course of
treatment. All eligible patients, that is, 4091 patients were
included in the trial: 1984 in the control arm (10 clinics)
and 2107 in the intervention arm (10 clinics).
Intention-to-treat analysis showed a small but non-
significant improvement in treatment success rates in
intervention clinics (intervention 76.2%; control 70.7%;
risk difference 5.6% (−1.2; 12.3%), P = 0.107). There was a
strong dose-response effect; treatment success increased
with the number of vouchers received (P <0.001). However,
fidelity to the intervention was low. Of all the patients who
were eligible to receive a voucher, 813 (36.2%) did not re-
ceive a voucher at all, and 671 (32.3%) received a voucher
for between one and three months. The remainder re-
ceived a voucher for four to eight months of treatment.
The value of process evaluations of randomized
controlled trials
Although randomized controlled trials provide high
quality evidence for the efficacy or effectiveness of an
intervention, they often do not provide contextual infor-
mation that might help explain the findings of the trial.
Such information is particularly important in pragmatic
trials where the real-world settings in which interven-
tions are delivered may have a profound impact on the
conduct and the findings of the trial. Process evaluations
conducted alongside such trials can provide valuable in-
sights on why the trial yielded such results, which is im-
portant for the replication or large-scale implementation
of trial interventions [13].
Process evaluations attempt to view the trial from the
perspective of the implementers and the recipients and
use both qualitative and quantitative methods to analyze
the contributions of a variety of factors to the effectiveness,
or otherwise, of an experimental intervention [14]. Import-
antly, where an intervention is not effective, process evalua-
tions can help to ascertain whether it is the intervention
itself that is inherently flawed or whether the way in which
it was delivered undermined its effectiveness [15].
This process evaluation focuses on how participants in
the trial viewed the economic support provided to pa-
tients with TB, and how these views impacted on the
conduct of the trial. It also explores participants’ opin-
ions on the principle of economic assistance for the
achievement of health outcomes, which has important
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search into, such interventions.
In addition to helping to explain the trial results, it was
important that a process evaluation be conducted along-
side this trial because the provision of social welfare in
South Africa (and elsewhere), including economic support
to people with specific illnesses, remains a contested issue
[16,17]. Specific concerns that have been expressed are
that: social grants will have a perverse incentive effect
(people will behave in a way that will ensure continuation
of the grant; for example, patients with TB will deliberately
not complete their treatment in order to continue receiving
a grant for TB); people will become dependent on the
grants and will not try to find work because their needs are
met by the grant; and finally, people will spend the grant
monies on frivolous or unhealthy items. It was important
that this trial investigate and report on these issues.
Methods
This was a qualitative process evaluation, conducted in
the final few months of the trial. This process evaluation
was based on in-depth interviews describing the views
and perceptions of the key stakeholders in the trial.
Trial setting
This trial, and this process evaluation, was conducted in
one rural district (Uthungulu) and one urban district
(eThekwini) of KwaZulu-Natal (South Africa) which have
the fifth and sixth highest TB incidence of the 52 districts
in the country, respectively [18]. In a deprivation ranking
of all South African districts, eThekwini lies within socio-
economic quintile 4, and Uthungulu in socioeconomic
quintile 2 (where quintile 5 is least deprived, and quintile
1 is most deprived) [6]. Within eThekwini, however, are
large areas of deep poverty, such as informal settlements
and former townships. It is in these areas of the city that
the study was conducted.
Population and sampling
Clinics with cure rates of between 40 and 70% for the
year preceding the trial were eligible for inclusion. All
patients diagnosed with pulmonary drug-sensitive TB,
and attending intervention clinics within the period 1
July 2009 to 31 March 2010 were recruited into the trial
and started receiving the voucher immediately, irrespect-
ive of their stage of treatment. However, only patients who
started TB treatment within this recruitment period were
eligible for analysis. The Consort flow diagram depicting
the flow of patients in the trial is shown in Figure 1. The
Consort checklist is available in Additional file 1.
Interviews were conducted with patients who had re-
ceived vouchers, nurses who had administered vouchers
at intervention clinics, shop owners, managers, and ca-
shiers at the shops where vouchers were redeemed, andmanagers of the TB Control Programme at district, pro-
vincial, and national levels, who had been involved in or
were well informed about the trial. In each clinic, the
nurse in charge of providing TB care was selected to
participate in this process evaluation. Similarly, in each
district, the managers of the TB Control Programme were
asked to participate, as was the national manager of the
TB Control Programme. The manager of each shop was
approached to participate but in some cases, she or he
delegated a staff member to do so. All eligible patients at-
tending the clinics within the period of data collection for
this process evaluation were approached to participate.
All nurses interviewed were professional nurses, with a
median nursing experience of 15 years. Patients had a me-
dian of 8 years schooling. Sixty nine percent of patients
were unemployed, 14% worked in the informal sector, 3%
worked in the formal sector, and 14% were too young to
work. Study participants are further described in Table 1.
Interviews were conducted with patients and nurses at
intervention clinics. Clinics were purposefully selected to
represent the range of settings in the trial, so that large,
small, urban, and rural clinics were included. Nurses in
charge of the TB program at seven out of ten participating
clinics were interviewed. At the same clinics, patients were
approached to be interviewed if they were receiving the
voucher and if they were attending one of the seven selected
clinics on the day on which interviewers were present.
Seven out of eight shops were included in this process
evaluation. This ensured that the range of stores partici-
pating in the trial (which included large chain stores as
well as small owner-managed shops, from both urban and
rural areas) were represented. Personnel in management
positions who had been involved in the administration of
the vouchers were invited to participate. Four adminis-
tration managers, one general manager, one owner, and
one cashier were interviewed.
Three senior TB managers from the two districts and
one from the province in which the trial was conducted
were interviewed, as well as one senior TB manager from
the national level. These managers were selected because
of their role in the running of the TB Control Programme,
their awareness of the study from its inception, and
because they were involved in policy formulation for TB
management. No participants refused to be interviewed.
Data collection
Interviews were semi-structured and the focus of the
interviews was the administration of the voucher, the
effects of the voucher on patients’ adherence to treatment,
and the principle of providing economic assistance for the
improvement of health outcomes.
The data collection process was iterative, in that follow-
up interviews were conducted with selected participants
to clarify issues raised in the initial interviews, or to
Figure 1 Consort flow diagram of trial. TB, tuberculosis.
Table 1 Participant demographic information
Group (number interviewed) N (%) urban N (%) female Median age Median level of education
Patients (29) 18 (62) 22 (76) 35 Grade 10
Nurses (7) 5 (71) 5 (71) 40 All professional nurses
Managers in the TB Control Programme (5) 3 (60) 49 Data not collected
Shop personnel (7) 5 (71) 5 (71) 30 Data not collected
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the voucher system. Interviews were conducted until
data saturation was reached.
All interviews were conducted face-to-face, audio-
recorded with the consent of the interviewee, transcribed
verbatim, and translated into English where necessary.
Interviews with patients were conducted in isiZulu,
whilst interviews with all other participants were conducted
in English. Research assistants, who were trained by a quali-
fied qualitative researcher, introduced themselves to all par-
ticipants, emphasizing that they were from an independent
research organization and not affiliated with the health
services. Patients were assured that non-participation in the
interviews would not affect their participation in the trial
nor their receipt of services from the clinic. Interviews with
patients lasted about 75 minutes, whilst those with nurses
and TB managers lasted about an hour, and those with
shop personnel lasted about 30 minutes. Interviews with
patients took place in the clinic grounds away from the
clinic building, or in an unused room within the clinic, to
preserve patient privacy. Interviews with nurses took place
in unused consulting rooms or offices at the clinics, whilst
those with shop owners, managers, and cashiers took
place in the administration offices of the shops. Interviews
with TB program managers took place in their offices or
at a designated public meeting place.
Data analysis
Interviews were analyzed thematically. Transcripts
were coded manually, and from these codes, themes
were built up, both within the groups of interviewees
(patients, nurses, TB managers, and shop personnel)
and across these groups. Both similarities and differences
between interviewees’ responses were noted and divergent-
views were described (these were views that did not fit with
the general trend of the findings, but that needed to be con-
sidered and accounted for in the final explanation) [19].
Transcripts of interviews were read and re-read so that re-
curring ideas (meaning units) could be identified. Abstrac-
tions (codes) of these meaning units were developed, and
categories of codes built up into subthemes and themes
[19]. For each key analytic theme, data extracts were identi-
fied on the basis of being representative and/or interesting
illustrations of an emerging issue. The process of data ana-
lysis is illustrated in Table 2. Analysis was undertaken by
the principal investigator and one of the co-investigators,
with contributions from the research assistants who were
involved in data collection. Analysis was informed by the
principal investigator’s knowledge of the setting and of TB
care. However, no formal theoretical stance was taken.
Ethical considerations
Ethical approval for the trial and its process evaluation
was received from the Committee for Human Research atthe University of Stellenbosch (reference N07/10/245).
The trial was registered with Current Controlled Trials
(reference ISRCTN50689131), the South African Clinical
Trials Registry (reference DOH-27-0409-2791), the
Wellcome Trust Register of Clinical Trials (reference
083619), and the Pan-African Clinical Trials Registry
(reference PACTR2010010001275437).
Written informed consent was obtained from all par-
ticipants in the language of their choice (either isiZulu
or English). Patients were assured that non-participation
in the interviews would not impact on the treatment
they received from the clinic, nor on their continued
participation in the trial. All participants were assured of
confidentiality and no participants were paid for taking
part in these interviews.
The hard copies of interviews and participants’ consent
forms were stored by the principal investigator in locked
drawers. Electronic copies of interviews were stored on the
password-protected computer of the principal investigator.
Results
The intention-to-treat results of the trial showed that al-
though patients who received vouchers had a moderately
higher treatment success rate than those in control
clinics, this was not statistically significant. Part of the
reason for this was the low fidelity to the intervention
protocol: of the 2076 patients who were eligible to re-
ceive a voucher for the six to eight months of their
treatment, 813 (36.2%) did not receive a voucher at all,
and 671 (32.3%) received a voucher for between one
and three months. The remainder received a voucher
for four to eight months of treatment.
This process evaluation shows that the low fidelity
occurred for reasons of both principle (participants’
perceptions of equity and social justice) and process
(the logistics of voucher administration).
Equity and social justice in the implementation of the
voucher system
The perceptions of all participants were that it was oper-
ationally feasible to administer the voucher to patients as
a routine part of the TB Control Programme. However,
many patients and nurses believed that vouchers should
not be given to patients who were relatively better off fi-
nancially. Nurses noted that it seemed unfair not to give
vouchers to patients who were more deprived even if they
did not meet the clinical eligibility criteria, and equally
unfair to give to those who, for example, were employed
or in receipt of a social grant but did met the eligibility
criteria. One nurse commented that:
‘I would decide by looking at who is needy, considering
their social problems, then I will give … like if they
do tell me they can’t take pills on an empty stomach
Table 2 Example of the analytic process
Meaning unit Code Sub-theme Theme
‘It helps me as I say that when I receive the voucher I am able to
buy food and take my tablets on the right time; I have to eat before
I swallow my tablets that is how the voucher is helping me.’
Voucher helps with buying
food with which to take
tablets
Important role of voucher
is to prevent having to take
tablets on empty stomach
Role of voucher
in improving
adherence
‘… you know that you can only get the voucher while you are on
treatment. The minute you are out, it’s back to square one, and those
needs that were catered for by those vouchers are now left hanging
and the patient might be tempted to default treatment so that to
continue getting these vouchers.’
Patients may want to remain
ill in order to continue
receiving voucher
The voucher may act as
a perverse incentive
Negative effects
of voucher
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those who are working I wouldn’t give …’ (Nurse,
Clinic 7 page 3).
Nurses felt that it was not difficult to assess the patients’
levels of need:
‘It’s easy (to decide who is needy)… By history taking I
can ask them, how many members of the family, who
is a breadwinner, who is working, then I can assess
from there’ (Nurse, Clinic 8 page 4).
The patients themselves felt that this was fair - if they
were doing well financially that month, it was better
that someone else received the voucher that they might
have taken:
‘Sometimes I do not ask for it, if I see that I do have
something’ (Patient, Clinic 5 page 2).
Furthermore, patients, nurses, and shop personnel were
concerned that only certain patients (those with pulmonary
TB) were eligible to receive the voucher. They felt that this
was unfair, given the depth of deprivation experienced by
some patients:
‘I do hear them saying that the voucher is given to
those with PTB [pulmonary TB] only … They are
complaining - you know people they also want to get
the voucher, they are not happy that some people are
receiving it while others don’t’ (Mother of 5-year-old
patient, Clinic 7 page 4).
Even one cashier was distressed by this exclusivity:
‘If you could also try and help the others not just the
TB patients. We also have people sick besides (those)
diagnosed with TB’ (Cashier, Shop 4 page 5).
Managers of the TB program also perceived this as a
problem, not for the reasons of equity cited by patients
and nurses, but because they feared that it would act as
a perverse incentive:‘If you target for example the TB patients, then people
see that TB patients have better or get things for just
being TB patients. So now everyone will want to have
TB to get those things especially if they are in need,
like food and all those things’ (TB Manager page 4).
‘… you know that you can only get the voucher while
you are on treatment. The minute you are out, it’s
back to square one, and those needs that were catered
for by those vouchers are now left hanging and the
patient might be tempted to default treatment so that to
continue getting these vouchers’ (TB manager, page 2).
It was clear from the interviews that all participants
found the exclusivity of giving vouchers only to a select
group of patients to be problematic. The targeting of
economic support to certain groups to the exclusion of
others is an important issue in addressing the social de-
terminants of health. How participants are selected for
any program that seeks to address poverty-related risk
factors for disease may be contentious among participants
and administrators of the program. The perceptions of
those who implement economic interventions to improve
health outcomes, and of those who receive these interven-
tions, may have profound effects on the process of imple-
mentation and the effectiveness of such interventions. In
this trial, such perception lead nurses to limit the number
of vouchers received by eligible patients because they felt
that some patients did not need vouchers at all and some
needed them only intermittently. The effect that this had
on the fidelity to the intervention protocol may have
undermined the impact of the voucher and contributed to
the non-significant findings of the trial.
Logistical issues in the implementation of the
voucher system
Logistical reasons for patients not receiving vouchers
every month included that the vouchers were sometimes
not available (because they had not been delivered on
time to the clinic by investigators) and that some nurses
only distributed vouchers at the end of the month.
Although the investigators visited the participating clinics
every four to six weeks, clinics would sometimes run out of
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notify the investigators of this problem on the day that the
vouchers ran out, and it was not always possible to deliver
voucher books to clinics quickly enough to prevent some
patients from leaving the clinic without vouchers. Patients
commented that:
‘Sometimes it happens that you come for the voucher
and find there are no vouchers. They say come on the
following or the third day’ (Patient, Clinic 7 page 3).
In addition, some nurses found it logistically easier to
issue all vouchers in one batch at the end of the month.
Patients were therefore required to return to the clinic
at the end of the month to get their vouchers.
Travelling to the clinic on another day to collect their
vouchers would have imposed additional costs on pa-
tients, and very poor patients may not have been able to
afford these additional visits. Similarly, patients who
were working may not have been able to take time off
work for an additional clinic visit, and patients who were
very ill may not have been able to visit the clinic a sec-
ond time in a month. Although the proportion of pa-
tients affected by these factors was not quantified in the
trial, this qualitative process evaluation suggests that at
least some patients were affected by them.
Perceived effects of the voucher on adherence to treatment
Nurses felt that the voucher had improved adherence to
treatment:
‘The adherence was excellent! Even if you check their
files they were coming monthly now, there was no need
to keep on phoning them to come forward for more
treatment, they come monthly because they knew that
they will get the voucher …’ (Nurse, Clinic 9 page 1).
‘I saw that it was bringing back the patients, because
patients were informing others about the voucher and
the defaulters were coming back to the clinic…
Adherence has increased even on the strepto
[streptomycin] patients, knowing that they’ll get the
voucher every month…. Since the voucher we haven’t
had a case where someone [was] stopping treatment
and then coming back. We haven’t had patients
defaulting’ (Nurse, Clinic 8 pages 1 and 2).
Patients also noted that the voucher enabled better
adherence to treatment, through addressing barriers to
adherence that were related to poverty:
‘Yes, having no money can have an effect [on adherence].
Since in the clinic we are given a specific date to collect
our treatment, if one does not have money on that daythat will be the problem… [Also] If you have TB you
must take nutritious food and [if] you don’t have money
you can’t take that kind of food’ (Patient, Clinic 3 page 1).
The voucher was seen by patients to have alleviated
some of these problems:
‘Yes it has made it better for me to take my pills, we
were so happy about receiving it, food is a problem’
(Patient, Clinic 7 page 5).
‘It truly made it easier. I get motivated to take my
treatment and I can’t wait for my date to go to the
clinic for my treatment.’ (Patient, Clinic 8 page 1).
Impacts of the voucher on patient poverty
The effects of the voucher on household food expenditure
and, by implication, on household food security, will be
reported elsewhere. However, in this qualitative process
evaluation many patients, nurses, and shop personnel
noted that the value of the voucher was small:
‘It does help me for the time being. I think food for
R120 is too small, but I appreciate what they are
giving me … the vouchers are small, the voucher is for
us to eat for few days, and it’s finished’ (Patient, Clinic
5 pages 1 and 5).
From the perspective of patients, the main value of the
voucher lay in providing food with which to take their
TB medication. A major theme that emerged from patient
interviews was that it was very difficult to take TB tablets
on an empty stomach. Doing so made many patients feel
very hungry and it made others feel ill. For others, eating
before taking their tablets was seen to increase the efficacy
of the treatment:
‘Just imagine as I have said how difficult it is to take
them on an empty stomach. In fact it seems as if they
are not helping you here but they are killing you!’
(Patient, Clinic 7 page 6).
‘If you take the tablet without eating anything that
tablet will not work - where is it going to stay? It’s better
if you got something to eat first’ (Mother of 5-year-old
patient, Clinic 7 page 4).
In many cases, patients shared the food purchased
with their vouchers with their families as it was consid-
ered to be against the norms of family behaviour to eat
it alone:
‘Yes I have to share with them I cannot be able to eat
alone … We are a family I cannot be able to eat by
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Clinic 7 page 4).
However in some cases, especially in the case of chil-
dren or the elderly, the food was reserved for the index
patient alone.
‘It’s for the child … This money is hers, the voucher
belongs to her as she is taking the treatment’ (Mother
of 5-year-old patient, Clinic 7 page 5).
The view that the voucher enabled patients to buy more
food with which to take their tablets was echoed by many
participants. However, the practice of sharing this food may
have impacted on the benefit that the index patient derived.
If the economic support intended for one patient only is
shared with family or community members, the efficacy of
that support may be diluted. The targeting and sharing of
economic support for the improvement of health outcomes
is an important area for further research.
Economic assistance to improve health outcomes
Given the study context of widespread poverty, nurses
did not see the principle of ‘paying patients’ to behave in
a healthy way as problematic:
‘It’s like we are supporting them [the patients] and it’s
a good thing because people don’t have jobs so I don’t
see it as paying them, rather as supporting needy
people’ (Nurse, Clinic 8 page 3).
However, managers of the TB program had a rather
more complex approach to the principle of economic as-
sistance to improve health outcomes. On the one hand,
they were supportive of the idea of financial support for
TB patients and also felt that it was important to address
poverty in patients with TB:
‘If we just leave those patients [don’t materially
support them] chances are we will get them coming
back again with the disease… I think if we address
poverty, if we improve the living conditions of people,
then we will go a long way towards addressing TB’
(Senior TB Manager page 2).
However, they were concerned about creating depend-
ency on the vouchers and providing a perverse incentive
to remain ill:
‘We have had cases where patients will sell their
sputum… Ja, we’ve had cases where they will sell their
TB counts and cards and move into other clinics so
that they can be considered to be on treatment and
then, so that they can get [the disability] grant. So itdoes create dependence and there are loops within the
system that make it vulnerable to misuse…’ (Senior TB
Manager page 3).
Although it did not seem to detract from her support of
the continuation of the voucher, one nurse echoed this fear:
‘The way people are depending on the money, some
want to be sick’ (Nurse, Clinic 8 page 3).
A related concern of one senior TB manager was that
receipt of the voucher would make it unnecessary for
patients to work:
‘The reason why people go for those grants is to get
something to support their families….. So I see it as
perpetuating the culture of not working because
they’re relying on the grant maybe… we don’t want to
create a situation where people are dependent on
some monetary incentive somewhere’ (Senior TB
Manager page 2).
These complex views reflect both the perceptions of
the deep poverty which prevails in KwaZulu-Natal and
the effects of poverty on illness, as well as ideas on how
poverty should be addressed. These views echo age-old
debates over social support for the poor and are discussed
further below.
Leakage and misuse of the vouchers
The terms ‘leakage’ and ‘misuse’ are used variably by
studies investigating the use of vouchers to incentivize
behaviour change [20]. In this paper, the term ‘leakage’
refers specifically to the receipt of the voucher by groups
not eligible to receive it, whilst ‘misuse’ is a broader term
which encapsulates the concept of leakage and includes
the theft or fraudulent acquisition of a voucher, as well
as inappropriate use of the vouchers, for example on cig-
arettes or alcohol (to be reported elsewhere).
The ‘leakage’ of vouchers to those for whom they were
not intended was closely monitored in this study. The in-
vestigators were able to correlate all vouchers issued by the
clinics with those redeemed from the shops.
Generally, patients, nurses, and shop personnel were
happy that, on some occasions, relatives or friends of vou-
cher recipients redeemed the vouchers on their behalf.
However, there were three reports from interviewees of
cases where patients were not given their vouchers, or the
goods redeemed with their vouchers, by the people who
had collected them:
‘… we have the Nompilo’s [lay DOT supporters] …
there is a lot of cruelty going on, they act like they are
coming to get it [the voucher] for you when they take it
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and get it yourself ’ (Patient, Clinic 7 page 6).
‘only exceptional … case where I discovered that one
patient complained that some of the family members
were taking the food … but only one patient … we
could rectify that mistake’ (Nurse, Clinic 9 page 1).
One shop owner said that a stolen voucher had been
brought in to be redeemed:
‘One case happened when a voucher was stolen but we
managed to sort that one out ….I can’t remember
clearly what happened but the story from the cashiers
was that someone came even before the voucher was
redeemed and said his voucher has been stolen and
told them his name. When the person who stole the
voucher came through he was asked his name and
proof of that name and he left the voucher there and
never came back’ (Owner, Shop 5, page 2).
There were no occasions where the theft or loss of a
voucher had to be investigated, or where the issuing of
vouchers had to be stopped due to such problems.
Discussion
This qualitative process evaluation provides contextual
and process information which goes beyond the trial de-
sign and methodology to explain the trial findings [15].
Importantly, it sheds light on some of the reasons for
the poor fidelity to the intervention protocol of the trial,
and in so doing, explains to some extent why the effects
of the intervention were small. It also provides insights
into the perceived value of economic support in improv-
ing TB treatment outcomes, as well as into participants’
broader views on the concept of economic assistance for
the improvement of health outcomes. These findings
may help to inform further research as well as the large
scale implementation of similar interventions, in other
contexts [15]. There were two important factors that
detracted from fidelity to the intervention protocol:
nurses’ perceptions of the inequity of the criteria for
receiving vouchers; and logistical issues involved in
voucher administration. Nurses modified the delivery
of these vouchers in several ways but, perhaps most
importantly for this trial, they rejected the eligibility
criteria as being unjust. Working in a context of wide-
spread and deep poverty, it seemed unfair to them to give
vouchers only to those who met the eligibility criteria
when some of those who met the criteria needed the
voucher less and some who didn’t meet the criteria
needed it more. Although the eligibility criteria for receipt
of a voucher (which did not include socioeconomic status)
were clearly outlined to nurses at the start of the trial, theimperative to ration the vouchers was stronger. Nurses
frequently ration the food parcels that may be provided
to needy patients as part of their routine TB treatment
because there is usually insufficient food to give to every
patient, and they seemed to treat the vouchers in the
same way. This rationing impacted on the delivery of
the vouchers and reaffirms the importance of the ‘street
level bureaucrat’ as an implementer [21]. Lipsky [22]
suggests that ‘street level bureaucrats’ (public service
workers who have important roles in delivering govern-
ment services, have constant interaction with members
of the public, and are able to use their own discretion in
carrying out their activities) are not passive media through
which the policy or intervention passes from the designers
to the recipients. On the contrary, implementers can be
seen as active in interpreting and, if considered necessary,
modifying policies or interventions, to the extent that they
can may constitute a level of policy-making themselves
[22]. Logistical problems also impacted on fidelity to the
delivery of the intervention. In some clinics it was admin-
istratively easier for nurses to give out all the vouchers at
the end of the month, but this required patients to come
back to the clinic at this time to receive them. Because the
study team was small, there were also logistical difficulties
with delivering vouchers to all clinics on time. Voucher
books were personally delivered to all clinics and collected
from all shops by the principal investigator and one assist-
ant, with staff at clinics and shops required to sign proof
of delivery or collection. This meant that vouchers were
sometimes not available for patients on their appointment
dates, which necessitated another visit to the clinic to col-
lect them. Although the frequency of these occurrences
were not quantified and seemed a less important barrier
to the implementation of the vouchers than the nurses’
rationing, they were raised by some interviewees in this
process evaluation. Such logistical issues should be con-
sidered in the replication of similar interventions in
other settings. The coordination of delivery of vouchers
to clinics and collection of vouchers from shops requires
considerable organization and a dedicated staff comple-
ment. Setting up the infrastructure to manage the voucher
system may be difficult where health systems are weak
and resources very limited.
Related to issues of logistics are mechanisms for con-
trol of the distribution and use of the voucher. There
were very few cases of leakage of the vouchers to those
for whom they were not intended. In only one case was
the theft of a voucher reported and even in this case the
theft was reported before the voucher could be redeemed.
More common was the fear that lay Directly Observed
Treatment Supporters (DOT supporters) [23] who might
collect vouchers on behalf of patients who were too ill to
collect them themselves, would either not give the vouchers
to the patients or would buy food for themselves. Even this,
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level of leakage of vouchers in this study was thus very
small compared to the levels experienced at provincial and
national levels with other social grants. For example, in
a different province of South Africa, 3000 cases of social
grant fraud were recently handed over to the Special
Investigating Unit for prosecution. Although it is possible
that cases of leakage would increase if vouchers were de-
livered on a larger scale, the system used in this study is
promising in terms of minimizing that potential.
Like patients in Mexico’s conditional cash transfer pro-
gram [24], we found that many patients shared their
voucher purchases with their families, and that this was
consistent with their social values. Although this may
have diluted the effect of the vouchers for the index pa-
tients, for many it was inconceivable that they should keep
the voucher to themselves. Like other social grants in South
Africa, the material benefits of the grant are generally dis-
tributed throughout the household, so that the household
is the unit that benefits rather than the individual recipient
[25]. Therefore, for this voucher (as for other social grants)
it is important to note that the impact of policies targeted
at individuals will be mediated by household dynamics [26].
If the value of the voucher had been larger the dispersion
of this benefit may have improved the nutritional status of
other household members and so reduced their risk of con-
tracting or developing TB [27-29]. However, because it was
relatively small these sharing practices may have meant that
neither the index patients nor their households could bene-
fit maximally from the vouchers.
Nurses were of the view that patients who received the
voucher came back to the clinics to collect their tablets
regularly, and that even known defaulters returned to
the clinic to resume treatment. One of the reasons for the
perceived improvement in adherence is that most patients
who were interviewed valued the food purchases that they
could make with their vouchers, and that this food helped
to avoid having to take tablets on an empty stomach. This
is consistent with the ‘enabling’ effect of economic sup-
port to poor patients who are ill; that is, that such support
enables adherence by minimizing some of the barriers to
adherence imposed by poverty.
This qualitative process evaluation showed that patients
generally felt that the value of the voucher (R120.00) was
small, and indeed it was, compared to the Child Support
Grant (valued at R250.00 per month at the time of the
trial), the Old Age Pension, and the Disability Grant
(both valued at R1080.00 per month at the time of the trial).
However, it was about a fifth of the value of the median per
capita income in KwaZulu-Natal around the time of the
trial [30], and most participants said it was helpful, particu-
larly in enabling them to buy the food to take their tablets
with. This was a powerful theme in the patients’ interviews,
with most saying that it was impossible to take tablets onan empty stomach. In this sense, the voucher enabled
patients to take tablets where this may have been diffi-
cult without it.
Acknowledging the link between poverty and TB, the
TB managers and nurses interviewed in this study agreed
in theory with the principle of social assistance for people
who are poor and ill. However, managers raised concerns
about the impact of a financial transfer to patients with
TB in terms of the development of dependency on the
grant which is a widespread concern in the country [31].
However, this fear was not realized in our study, which
suggested that the more often patients received vouchers
the more likely they were to achieve treatment success
[12]. It is interesting to note, however, that concerns around
dependency on grants and their perverse incentive effects
go back a long way in South Africa’s history, and were
important debates at the time of the Lund Commission
in 1995 [16] and the Carnegie Commission in 1932 [17].
These concerns persist today and relate largely to the
concept of the ‘deserving poor’, a concept first articu-
lated in the Poor Laws of Elizabethan England and they
remain an area of debate for welfare states today [32]. In
essence, the poor who deserve assistance from the state
are felt to be those who are unable to work, such as the
very young, the elderly, and the disabled. However, in
current day South Africa the opportunities for formal
employment are diminishing and those which are available
are increasingly for people with a completed secondary or
tertiary education [33]. Social grants are an important,
perhaps even a crucial, means of survival for the poor in
this country [34]. Further research is therefore needed to
explore whether these perverse effects are indeed found in
practice in order to inform ongoing debates.
Conclusions
This qualitative process evaluation of a cluster random-
ized controlled trial provides evidence of the importance
of contextual factors in influencing the implementation
and effectiveness of economic support to patients with
TB in South Africa. The delivery of a voucher to enable
better adherence to TB treatment was well received by
patients, health workers, and shop personnel in this trial.
Both patients and nurses felt that it improved adherence,
particularly patients, who felt that the voucher enabled
them to buy food with which to take their tablets, thereby
making treatment taking easier.
However, a number of factors limited the reach of the
voucher to all eligible patients. Some of these factors
were a consequence of the beliefs and values of the
nurses who distributed them and others were logistical.
Nurses felt strongly that vouchers should be given out
on the basis of need rather than on trial eligibility, and
this is likely to have reduced the extent to which the
intervention was delivered as intended. Administrative
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a failure on the part of investigators to ensure that all
clinics had an uninterrupted supply of vouchers, and a
preference in some clinics for giving out vouchers in
batches at the end of the month instead of at the time
of the patients’ appointments. These factors explain
some of the reasons for the non-significant results of
this trial and must be addressed in further research
around such interventions.
Finally, managers of the TB Control Programme raised
concerns about the development of dependence on the
vouchers and a perverse incentive effect. Although nei-
ther of these fears were realized in our trial, and are not
supported by data from other studies, they are deeply
felt by many in South African society and have been
prevalent in the country since early on in the development
of its social welfare system.
Although enough is known about the association be-
tween poverty and TB to justify action [1], there is very
little evidence on what type of action works best in dif-
ferent contexts. Available evidence from randomized
controlled trials is centered in the United States [11]
and may not be applicable to middle- and low-income
countries where the burden of TB is highest. More research
on existing economic interventions, as well as further trials
on new types of such interventions, are important to ascer-
tain how best to deliver economic support to those suffer-
ing from, and susceptible to TB.Additional file
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